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Abstract 
 
 How did Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1960s, become a model 
of success for developing economies just five decades later? This paper analyzes the role that 
chaebols, large Korean conglomerates, played in bringing about robust economic growth to the 
country since the conclusion of the Korean War. The broad research question was: What is the 
effect of chaebols’ dominance in the Korean economy on Korea’s growth rate? I argue that 
chaebols have had a positive impact on Korea’s growth rate by being the main drivers of Korea’s 
export-oriented industrialization, achieved through economies of scale. I also discuss two most 
prominent features of chaebols—diversification and vertical integration—and how they enabled 
chaebols to achieve overall efficiency in production. Using cross-sectional and time-series data, I 
perform regression analysis to examine the effect of chaebols’ dominance on Korea’s growth 
rate, compared with the average growth rate of the rest of the world and with Korea’s own long-
term average growth rate. The results show that, holding constant exports, education, savings 
rate, population growth, regime type, and natural resources, the effect of chaebols’ dominance on 
Korea’s average growth rate was statistically significantly positive when compared with the 
average growth rate of the rest of the world, but statistically insignificant when compared with 
Korea’s own average growth rate. The findings of this study present a new perspective on the 
isolated effect of chaebol dominance on Korea’s economic growth, and lay a foundation for 
several avenues for future research. 
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I. Introduction 
 After a devastating civil war that left the country in ruins, South Korea showed 
remarkable economic recovery in the following decades. Indeed, from the early 1960s to the 
mid-1990s, the Korean economy experienced the highest average rate of growth in the world—
roughly 9%.1 Scholars later dubbed this phenomenon the “Miracle on the Han River,” referring 
to Korea’s rapid postwar export-fueled growth, accompanied by industrialization, technological 
breakthroughs, an education boom, and a large increase in living standards all across the country. 
One of the poorest countries in the world at the beginning of the 1960s, Korea joined the ranks of 
industrial democracies within a single generation, becoming a member of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996.2 Today, Korea is the 15th largest 
economy in the world, is a G-20 member economy, has been appropriately called an “Asian tiger” 
nation along with three others, and boasts large automobile and electronics industries, some of 
which (e.g. Samsung, LG, Hyundai) have become household names in the United States. What 
explains this complete transformation? Some have argued that it primarily comes down to the 
export-led growth strategy adopted by Korea, often grouping Korea with several other Asian 
economies that also grew robustly by using the same strategy. However, this overly general 
explanation is neither sufficient nor satisfactory. Indeed, one scholar aptly emphasizes that 
development strategy for any country is a complex, multidimensional problem involving wide-
ranging areas such as the establishment of long-term targets for growth and structural change, 
and that development strategy should not be reduced to the dichotomy between export-oriented 
growth and import-substitution industrialization.3 The general consensus in the current literature 
                                                
1 Peter M. Beck, “Revitalizing Korea’s Chaebol,” Asian Survey 38 (1998): 1018. 
2 Wonhyuk Lim, “Chaebol and Industrial Policy in Korea,” Asian Economic Policy Review 7 (2012): 69. 
3 Ha-Joon Chang, “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 17 
(1993): 153. 
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is that a form of organizing the structure of companies unique to South Korea—called the 
chaebol—played an instrumental role in developing a highly versatile economy that was able to 
adapt to the changing international demands over time. 
 There has been ample literature dealing with different factors that served as impetus for 
Korea’s economic growth. Much of it has focused on Korea’s exports-driven growth strategy, 
while some have also examined the effect of other variables, such as democratization, emphasis 
on education, and population growth. The linkage between export performance and economic 
growth has been studied widely and there is a clear positive relationship between the two. 
Scholars explain that, both in general and specifically for Korea, an export-oriented 
industrialization strategy tends to exert a positive effect on growth through increases in saving 
and investment, technology, and possibility of structural change stemming from opening 
industries to world markets.4 There also appears to be a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between democracy and economic growth, as suggested by economist John F. Helliwell. He 
asserts that income has a positive effect on democracy because increases in income levels are 
likely to increase people’s demands for political and civil freedoms, and that democracy also has 
a positive effect on growth via education and investment.5 Population growth, too, has a non-
negligible positive effect on growth by encouraging the development of industries that are labor-
intensive.6 
While, as mentioned, there is a consensus in the literature that chaebols had an important 
role in growing and developing the South Korean economy, most lack a definitive focus of 
specific aspects of chaebols that enabled them to have a positive effect on growth. For instance, 
                                                
4 Rudiger Dornbusch et al., “Korean Growth Policy,” Brookings Paper on Economic Activity 2 (1987): 404. 
5 John F. Helliwell, “Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth,” British Journal of Political 
Science 24 (1994), 225. 
6 Wong Hock Tsen and Fumitaka Furuoka, “The Relationship between Population and Economic Growth in Asian 
Economies,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 22 (2005): 314-330. 
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many scholars have placed a lot of emphasis on the emergence and development of chaebols, 
tracing their evolution from the 1960s to the 1990s.7 They focus on the role of state intervention 
and the state-business cooperation, mentioning such government policies as the Five-Year 
Economic Development Plans.8 Some even go into the cultural and political foundations for 
chaebol, discussing such factors as characteristics of Korean employees and behavioral patterns 
of Korean people in general.9 While these authors certainly do examine the unique features of 
chaebols, such as family ownership and management, diversification into different industries, 
and vertical integration, they do not specifically delve into the effect of these features on Korea’s 
economic growth. 
Given this review of the current literature, the central question of my research is as 
follows: What is the effect of chaebols’ dominance in the Korean economy on Korea’s 
growth rate? The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between chaebol dominance in 
Korea and Korea’s economic growth. The aforementioned features of chaebols enabled them to 
grow quickly and establish a dominant position in the Korean economy. I contend that this 
dominant presence of chaebols, or the chaebol-centered growth strategy, played a crucial role in 
promoting Korea’s growth between the 1960s and the 1990s. In an attempt to establish the 
statistical significance of this relationship, I conduct multivariate regression analysis. Separately, 
I also offer insights into the key characteristics of chaebols, and how these characteristics 
contributed to their dominance in Korea’s economy. This combination of regressions analysis 
and qualitative discussion cannot easily be found in the current literature. Thus, by discussing 
chaebol dominance as a specific variable that contributed to Korea’s growth, I hope to fill in the 
gap in the existing set of explanations. 
                                                
7 Haggard, Lim, and Kim 2003; Chang 2003; Kim 1997; Chang and Chang 1994; Jwa 2002. 
8 Jwa 2002; Kim 1997; Chang 2003.  
9 Chang and Chang 1994. 
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This paper explains that chaebols’ dominance has had a positive impact on growth 
through their superior operation of economies of scale. After their creation and initial 
development in the 1960s, chaebols quickly and firmly established their dominant position in 
Korea’s economy with stellar export performance. In the process, chaebols gradually became 
what they are today—huge multi-industry conglomerates run by specific families. Government 
policy at the time helped form chaebols’ special structural features, the two most prominent of 
which are vertical integration and diversification. The former essentially refers to a process of 
indigenizing inputs for different stages of production, and the latter to the expansion of 
production into different, sometimes unrelated, industries. After chaebols became the 
cornerstone of Korea’s export-driven growth strategy by the mid- to late-1960s, they were 
considered, both by the government and private actors like banks, to be in an advantageous 
position to operate economies of scale to maximize profits. Faced with the increasing demands 
from the growing world markets, the Korean government pushed chaebols, who had the 
necessary capital base, into new industries, rather than subsidizing non-chaebol firms 
specializing in such industries. While this further widened the gap between chaebol firms and 
non-chaebol firms, this system of exclusive support for the large, established chaebol firms 
helped attain economies of scale more efficiently, thereby maximizing profits and promoting 
economic growth. 
In addition to an investigation of the mechanism through which chaebol dominance has 
affected Korea’s economic growth, I present findings from regression analysis to confirm the 
statistical significance of the effect. Using time-series/cross-sectional data obtained from extant 
literature, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Quality of Government 
Institute, I perform a series of multivariate regressions. The results suggest that, holding constant 
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export performance, education, savings rate, population growth, regime type, and availability of 
natural resources, chaebol dominance, measured by top 10 chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP, has 
a statistically significant effect on Korea’s GDP growth. 
Finally, I explore how chaebol features such as diversification and high degree of vertical 
integration helped chaebols operate economies of scale and overall efficiency of production. To 
this end, I look closely at how and why chaebols decided to diversify and vertically integrate in 
the first place, citing specific examples of chaebols engaging in this practice. 
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II. Background: Chaebol Origins and Characteristics 
What, then, is the chaebol? Many scholars define it in different ways. Most simply, a 
chaebol is a Korean business group that encompasses many subsidiary firms under the same 
name.10 There are many Korean companies with more than two subsidiaries that are controlled 
by one family, but the Korean government and media typically use “chaebols” to denote thirty 
largest business groups.11 Every year, the Korean government identifies the thirty largest 
business groups and publishes a listing of their affiliates under the “Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act” to block any anticompetitive behaviors. The act defines chaebols’ affiliates as 
those for which “either more than 30% of whose issued shares are owned by one person, his 
relatives, or a company controlled by him, or whose management such as appointing its officers 
is substantially affected.”12 There are numerous chaebol groups in Korea, the biggest and most 
prominent of which include companies like Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, and LG. It is 
important to note a few key characteristics that describe how chaebols are structured and 
designed to operate. First, many chaebols are family-run; often, the chairmanship is inherited 
from father to son. The current chairmen of Samsung and Hyundai, for example, have their 
respective sons in the company’s vice president positions, and they are expected to become 
chairmen after their fathers retire. Similarly, the current leaders of SK Group and LG also 
inherited their positions from family-member founders. Moreover, the rest of the founding 
family members virtually control chaebol firms through cross-holding of equity.13  
                                                
10 Sea-Jin Chang, Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and Fall of Chaebols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. 
11 Ibid., 10. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Seung-Rok Park and Ky-hyang Yuhn, “Has the Korean chaebol model succeeded?” Journal of Economic Studies 
39 (2012): 261. 
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Second, chaebols typically consist of a large number of affiliate companies that are 
engaged in different businesses, all operating under a single corporate group. This is called 
diversification, which essentially means that big chaebols are not simply engaged in one type of 
business, but instead in numerous different types of businesses that are often unrelated. For 
instance, the general American public perception of Samsung, the biggest chaebol in Korea, 
seems to be that it is a company focused primarily on producing electronic devices such as TVs, 
computers and mobile phones, but its corporate reach goes far beyond consumer electronics. 
Other industries in which Samsung subsidiaries are engaged include shipbuilding, construction, 
life insurance, surveillance and defense, and advertising. Although not as extensive as Samsung, 
other big chaebols in Korea are engaged in businesses they are not primarily known for. The 
average number of subsidiaries of the top 30 chaebols hovered around 22 for the 1990s,14 up 
from around 15 for the previous decade. 
Third, chaebol firms exhibit a high degree of vertical integration. Highly vertically 
integrated firms seek to “indigenize intermediate inputs imported from foreign upstream 
industries,” and Korean firms that would later emerge as big chaebols showed early efforts in the 
1960s by trying to vertically integrate through technology acquisition, human resource 
development, and construction of optimal-scale plants aimed for the global market.15 Samsung 
Electronics, for instance, makes most of the components that go into its own phones. This is in 
stark contrast with Apple, which does its own operating system and designs but contracts out all 
of the underlying hardware. The result is that it takes significantly less time for Samsung to go 
from contriving an idea to bringing a final product to markets, because it does most of the 
production process itself. 
                                                
14 Sung Hee Jwa, The Evolution of Large Corporations in Korea: A New Institutional Economics Perspective of the 
Chaebol (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2002), 45. 
15 Lim, 74. 
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 Given their sizes and the extent of their diversification and vertical integration, the 
chaebol firms’ contribution to Korean economy has recently been more significant than ever 
before. In 2011, the sales of Korea’s ten largest companies were equal to about 80% of the 
country’s GDP that year.16 Even more surprising is the fact that among all the chaebols that exist 
in Korea, the top firms are by far the biggest contributors. According to the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission, in 2013, South Korea’s top four conglomerates generated some 90% of the total net 
profit earned by the top 30 conglomerates.17 In the following sections, I discuss how chaebols 
became such big conglomerates, as well as how they established a dominant presence in Korea’s 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 Eun-jung Kwon, “Top ten chaebol now almost 80% of Korean economy,” The Hankyoreh, August 28, 2012, 
accessed December 9, 2014, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/549028.html. 
17 Koichi Kato, “Top four chaebol generate 90% of South Korean conglomerate profits,” Nikkei Asian Review, April 
10, 2014, accessed December 9, 2014, http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20140410-Growth-Central/Business/Top-
four-chaebol-generate-90-of-South-Korean-conglomerate-profits.  
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III. Research Question 
As mentioned earlier, there has been plenty of literature that explores sources for Korea’s 
economic miracle. While much of it has examined Korea’s export promotion and its effect on 
growth, some have also analyzed the effect of other variables, including regime type, emphasis 
on education, and population growth.  
Exports, for one, are a key component of gross domestic product, so an increase in 
exports is an important source for GDP growth. Unlike many Latin American countries that 
adopted import substitution industrialization (ISI) as their principal method of achieving 
economic growth throughout the post-WWII era,18 Korea quickly adopted an export-driven 
growth strategy. Korea started with an import substitution strategy in the early 1950s, with 
foreign aid financing the trade gap.19 By around 1960, however, it had “virtually exhausted the 
possibility of rapid growth through import substitution of nondurable consumer goods and 
intermediate inputs.”20 Additional import substitution of machinery, consumer durables, and 
their intermediate inputs was rejected because the domestic market was too small.21 Thus, faced 
with implied negative consequences of a continued ISI strategy, the Korean government 
intervened in order to promote exports-oriented industrialization. Intervention in the form of 
trade restrictions, subsidies, and credit allocation was pervasive.22 Scholars have noted that this 
type of outward-oriented strategy is supported by the efficiency of freer trade over a restrictive 
trade regime.23 Because export promotion is more closely related to free trade than is import 
substitution, Korea’s export-driven growth strategy has had a positive effect on saving and 
                                                
18 Werner Baer, “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations,” Latin 
American Research Review 7 (1972), 95. 
19 Dornbusch et al., 405.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 403. 
23 Ibid., 404. 
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investment, technology, and the possibility of structural change coming from opening industries 
to world markets.24 In summary, the high positive linkage between export performance and 
economic growth is “an accepted fact in development economics.”25 
On the relationship between regime type and economic growth, Helliwell explains that 
there is a two-way reinforcing linkage between democracy and economic growth.26 The effects 
of income on democracy, he notes, are found to be robust and positive. This positive effect is 
also theoretically supported because increasing levels of education and income are “likely to 
increase citizen demands for many things, including the range of political and civil freedoms that 
characterizes democratic systems.”27 Democracy also exerts a positive effect on growth via 
investment and education.28  This two-way strengthening relationship has held true for Korea. 
One scholar notes that the improvements in the quality of democracy contributed to sustaining 
high economic growth after the democratic transition in Korea, arguing essentially that an 
authoritarian Korea would likely have “failed to adjust to the changes in the economic 
environment caused by the end of the Cold War, the IT revolution, and the spread of 
globalization.”29  
Education, too, has served as a key determinant of industrialization—and in turn of 
economic growth—in Korea. Amsden asserts that while the role played by education in 
economic development in Korea ought not to be deified, a well-educated population in general 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Helliwell, 225-248. 
27 Ibid., 225. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Hyung Baeg Im, “Better democracy, better economic growth? South Korea,” International Political Science 
Review 32 (2011): 596. 
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and a plentiful supply of trained engineers in particular have been critical inputs in the 
industrialization process.30 
Population growth also has a non-negligible effect on growth. Tsen and Furuoka, through 
statistical analysis, have established bidirectional Granger causality between population and 
economic growth for Korea.31 They explain the rationale with a discussion about minimum wage: 
The issue of population and economic growth is […] closely related to the issue of 
minimum wage. Population growth enlarges labour force and, therefore, will push wage 
down. The standard economic labour demand model predicts that low wage will raise the 
demand for labour. As a result, the welfare of the economy is likely to increase. 
Moreover, low wage would encourage industries that are labour intensive. Low wage is 
said to be an important factor that has contributed to the industrialization of Asian newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs), namely Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.32  
  
 
While, as mentioned, there is plenty of literature examining the emergence, development 
and success of chaebols, most neglect a discussion about the specific aspects of chaebols that 
enabled them to have a positive effect on growth. For instance, many scholars have placed a lot 
of emphasis on the creation of chaebols and have traced their evolution from the 1960s to the 
1990s.33 They focus on the role of state intervention and the state-business cooperation, 
mentioning such government policies as the Five-Year Economic Development Plans.34 Some 
even go into the cultural and political foundations for chaebol, discussing such factors as 
characteristics of Korean employees and behavioral patterns of Korean people in general.35 
While these authors certainly do examine the unique features of chaebols, such as family 
ownership and management, diversification into different industries, and vertical integration, 
                                                
30 Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University 
Press, Inc., 1989), 238-9. 
31 Tsen and Furuoka, 314-330. 
32 Ibid., 315. 
33 Haggard, Lim, and Kim 2003; Chang 2003; Kim 1997; Chang and Chang 1994; Jwa 2002. 
34 Jwa 2002; Kim 1997; Chang 2003.  
35 Chang and Chang 1994. 
 14 
 
they fail to delve into the effects of these features on Korea’s economic growth. Given this gap in 
the current literature, the central question of my research is as follows: What is the effect of 
chaebols’ dominance in the Korean economy on Korea’s growth rate?  
Through this paper I hope to fill in an existing gap in the literature about the effects of 
chaebols’ dominance—or growing importance and influence—on Korea’s economic growth. But 
while my hypothesis links chaebol dominance with growth, I also consider what caused chaebols 
to dominate the Korean economy in the first place. In this paper I present multivariate regression 
analysis and comparative perspective, neither of which can easily be seen from the current 
literature. In addition to the regression analysis, I offer a qualitative discussion, explaining how 
and why top chaebol firms diversified and integrated vertically, the effect of diversification and 
vertical integration on efficiency and, by extension, on growth. Examining the pattern of chaebol 
expansion is important, as it helps further our understanding of the regression analysis by 
providing insight into the extended mechanism by which chaebols’ share of Korea’s output 
increased so significantly, thus complementing the results of regressions. 
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IV. Theory 
 States in which government-business collusion prevails can be effective in promoting 
domestic economic growth. The mechanism involved starts with a discussion about identifying 
the interests of the actors involved—namely, national government and corporations. A chief 
interest of government officials is to stay in power. The means to achieve maintenance of power 
can vary depending on the type of government, but a common way to secure power seems to be 
increasing prosperity and delivering economic growth. On the other hand, it is well known that 
all firms have a core interest in maximizing profit. To this end, firms strive to operate economies 
of scale to bring down production costs, and the government seeks out a strategy that can help 
the country grow. The result of interaction between growth-pursuing government and profit-
maximizing firms is a collaborative policy that can serve to further both ends. 
 On the basis of the above logic, I generate my two-part hypothesis for this paper. The 
proposed argument expects an increase in chaebols’ dominance in Korea to increase 
Korea’s economic growth rate, (a) relative to the world’s average growth rate and (b) 
relative to its own growth rate over time. The primary mechanism through which chaebols’ 
dominance affects Korea’s economic growth is economies of scale and export promotion through 
government support and incentives. Chaebols, like all firms, have a core objective of maximizing 
profit. The Korean government’s key concern in the late 1950s and early 1960s was delivering 
economic growth. Thus, the Korean government, in order to deliver economic growth to its 
people, selected a few firms based on family relations and essentially made them more 
productive by providing various types of economic support, including subsidies and tax breaks 
contingent on strong performance. In the 1960s, Korea also chose to promote growth through 
export-oriented industrialization, given its lack of natural resources and its relatively small 
 16 
 
domestic market. With this directive, the government provided subsidies and tax breaks to 
chaebol firms for export promotion, helping them grow in size, market share, and overall 
contribution to the economy. Further, exporters have a productivity advantage even before they 
start exporting;36 on balance, exporters are more productive, not as a result of exporting, but 
because only the most productive firms are able to overcome the costs of entering export 
markets.37 In the case of Korea, the most productive firms have been chosen and nurtured by the 
government.  
Initially, a set of policies by the Korean government designed to identify and support 
certain firms based on family relations led to chaebol formation. Because of the incentives—such 
as tax breaks, subsidies and allocation of foreign capital at low interest rates—provided by the 
government, chaebols began to diversify into various, sometimes unrelated, industries. The Park 
regime’s astute analysis of international economic demands during its reign enabled Korea to 
focus on key strategic industries that changed from decade to decade. Beginning with the advent 
of the heavy and chemical industrial (HCI) drive in the 1970s, and fueled by continued support 
from the government, chaebols were able to achieve economies of scale and increase profits. 
This, coupled with robust export markets provided by Japan and the United States, ultimately 
helped Korea produce export-led economic growth. Jae-Seung Shim and Moosung Lee explain 
that the government determined that chaebols were more suited to taking advantage of 
economies of scale: 
Big businesses were seen by government to be in a better position than small firms in the 
efficient use of resources and in strengthening competitiveness through economies of 
scale.38 [Government] measures resulted in a rapid increase in production and export 
capacity since business success for firms depended to a large extent on their export 
                                                
36 Bernard, et.al, “Firms in International Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (2007): 106. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Jae-Seung Shim and Moosung Lee, The Korean Economic System: Governments, Big Business and Financial 
Institutions (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 50. 
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performance. Chaebol were in a much better position than small firms in benefiting from 
economies of scale as well as in expanding production capacity. The government, too, 
favored a small number of large firms over a large number of small firms, since it was 
convenient for them to focus government attention in this way. Moreover, in allocating 
loans, banks preferred chaebol to small firms.39 
 
Thanks to the size they have achieved by the start of the HCI drive in the early 1970s, chaebols 
were in an advantageous position to attain economies of scale through large-scale production. 
This, along with Korea’s export-driven growth strategy, caused the importance of exports in 
Korea’s economy to increase dramatically throughout the decade. Indeed, to achieve scale 
economies, the government allocated export licenses to only a few companies, furthering the rise 
of chaebols. For instance, it chose Hyundai and Daewoo to develop power plant facilities and 
Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo to build ships.40 As a result, from 1971 to 1979, the proportion 
of exports to GNP increased from 16% to 36%.41 Thus, we can infer that chaebols’ attainment of 
scale economies—along with continued government support in the form of subsidies and tax 
breaks—helped them achieve better export performance, which in turn contributed directly to 
economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 Ibid., 82. 
40 Sea-Jin Chang, Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and Fall of Chaebols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 54. 
41 Ibid. 
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V. Analysis 
A. Methodology 
Conducting regression analysis for the effect of chaebol dominance on Korea’s economic 
growth first requires operationalizing the independent and dependent variables. The independent 
variable, chaebol dominance, can be appropriately measured by looking at the value added share 
of Korean GNP by top chaebol firms. I chose the chaebols’ value added share of GNP rather than 
sales share of GNP, since the latter gives “an inflated estimate of the importance of the chaebol 
[…] because transactions of semi-finished goods between firms within a group are included.”42 
On the other hand, value added is defined as “new value created by the producer during the 
production process,” and since GNP represents the sum of value added produced within a 
country from the production activity of all economic actors (plus overseas income earned by 
domestic residents minus domestic income earned by overseas residents), the total value added 
for a company can be considered a strong indicator of the importance that company holds in the 
national economy.43 In this sense, the value added measure is a much more reasonable and 
accurate measure of chaebols’ influence. This measure also makes intuitive sense because as 
chaebols become a more dominant influence in the Korean economy, their share of the country’s 
total output also increase—and vice versa. The dependent variable, economic growth, is 
expressed using the standard measure of annual GDP growth rate. 
In an attempt to reduce omitted variable bias, or bias produced by leaving out variables 
that also have an effect on economic growth, I have included in my regressions a list of variables 
that scholars agree affect economic growth: savings rate, population growth, exports, education, 
                                                
42 Robert C. Feenstra, Tzu-Han Yang and Gary G. Hamilton, “Business Groups and Product Variety in Trade: 
Evidence from South Korea, Taiwan and Japan,” Journal of International Economics 48 (1999): 74. 
43 Jung-ae Lee, “Top four chaebol’s value added accounts for nearly 10% of GDP,” The Hankyoreh, September 18, 
2014, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/655761.html. 
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natural resources, and regime type. Although this is not a comprehensive list, including these 
variables in the regressions helps to isolate the effect of chaebol dominance. Table 1 below 
summarizes the operationalization of the variables. 
 
Table 1. Operationalization of Variables 
Variables Measures 
Chaebol dominance Top 10 chaebols’ share of Korean GNP 
Economic growth GDP growth (annual %) 
Exports Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Education Gross enrollment ratio for tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6) 
Savings rate Gross savings (% of GDP) 
Population growth Population growth (annual %) 
Regime type Democracy (dichotomous; 1 if democracy, 0 otherwise) 
Natural resources Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators; Quality of Government Institute; Lim 
(2003); Hattori (1997); Jwa (2002). 
 
 Three points are worth clarifying with regard to the operationalization of the variables 
listed in Table 1. First, in operationalizing the education variable, I selected gross enrollment for 
tertiary education from a number of variables that could also serve as viable measures of 
education because the enrollment ratio variable most widely covered the countries and years 
included in my sample. Second, again for the education variable’s measure, ISCED refers to the 
International Standard Classification of Education, constructed by the United Nations as a result 
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of international agreement and adopted formally by UNESCO member states.44 The U.S. 
equivalents of ISCED level 5 (short-cycle tertiary education) and level 6 (Bachelor’s or 
equivalent level) are completion of an Associate’s degree and completion of a Bachelor’s degree, 
respectively.45 Third, total natural resources rents as a share of GDP can be calculated by taking 
the difference between the price at which the output from natural resources is sold and the costs 
of extraction and production. An increasing share of natural resources rents thus essentially 
represents a higher contribution of natural resources to GDP. Therefore, the resource rents share 
variable is hereafter referred to as the contribution of natural resources to GDP. 
Because of the limited availability of data for chaebols’ share of GNP for Korea, the 
initial table of regressions without sample restrictions showed a decrease in the number of 
observations each time a new control variable was added. Thus, in order to keep the sample 
consistent, the final multivariate regression with all of the controls included, which produced the 
smallest number of observations, effectively determined the sample for the entire regression 
analysis. 
 First, using a T-test, I establish that the difference in the average GDP growth rate 
between Korea and other countries in the sample is statistically significant—that is, the growth 
rate differential observed between Korea and the other countries is consistent and not due to 
chance. 
 Second, I run a simple bivariate regression—i.e. a regression of growth on chaebol 
dominance—in order to see if there is any association between the two variables. A statistically 
significant result here would then provide the basis for further multivariate regression analysis. 
                                                
44 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED 2011, 
UIS/2012/INS/10/REV (2012), http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Documents/isced-2011-en.pdf. 
45 National Center for Education Statistics, Comparative Indicators of Education in the United States and Other G-8 
Countries: 2011, NCES 2012-007 (October 2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012007.pdf.  
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 Third, provided that the bivariate regression yields statistically significant results, I 
proceed to run a series of multivariate regression, including the other aforementioned variables to 
reduce omitted variable bias. If the regression coefficient on the chaebol share of GNP is still 
statistically significant after controlling for omitted variables, then we can conclude that chaebols’ 
dominance in the Korean economy is a factor that causally contributed to Korea’s rapid 
economic growth in the decades following the conclusion of the Korean War. 
 Finally, to supplement the empirical findings for the regression analysis, I incorporate a 
qualitative discussion on the mechanism by which chaebols were able to attain a dominant 
position in the Korean economy, explaining how and why chaebols diversified and integrated 
vertically. 
 
 
B. Data Sources, Coding, and Coverage 
Data for the main explanatory variable, top 10 chaebols’ value added share of GNP, were 
procured from three different authors. Lim (2003) and Hattori (1997) provide data points for the 
years 1973-197846 and 198347, respectively, and Jwa (2002) gives data points for 1985-1995.48 
Due to the lack of availability of data for this measure for 1979-1982 and 1984, in coding this 
variable I repeated the value for 1978 for 1979-1982 and the value for 1983 for 1984. Data for 
one of the control variables, regime type, were collected from the Quality of Government 
Institute database. Data for the main dependent variable, annual GDP growth rate, were obtained 
from the World Bank collection of development indicators. Data for the dependent variable, 
                                                
46 Stephan Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim and Euysung Kim, Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in Korea: 
Reforming the Chaebol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47. 
47 Tamio Hattori, “Chaebol-style Enterprise Development in Korea,” The Developing Economies 35 (1997): 466.  
48 Jwa, 33. 
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annual GDP growth rate, as well as remaining control variables—exports as share of GDP, 
tertiary enrollment ratio, savings rate, population growth, and contribution of natural resources to 
GDP—have all been obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators online 
database. The final dataset includes 2,999 observations stretched across 163 countries for the 
years 1970-2008. A table listing all the countries and the years in the restricted sample for 
regressions is included in the appendix. 
 
 
C. Model 
My hypothesis stated that higher chaebol dominance, as measured by top 10 chaebols’ 
share of Korea’s GNP, would lead to higher economic growth. The basic linear bivariate 
regression model therefore included economic growth as the dependent variable and chaebol 
dominance as the independent variable. In order to account for the effects of other factors on 
economic growth, I controlled for six additional variables: 1) exports, measured by the total 
share of exports in GDP; 2) education, measured by the gross enrollment ratio for tertiary 
education; 3) savings rate, measured by the gross savings as a share of GDP; 4) population 
growth measured in annual percentage; 5) regime type, a dichotomous variable that indicates 
whether a country is democratic or autocratic; and 6) natural resources, measured by the 
contribution natural resources to GDP.  
Model: Change in GDP growth = α + β1 (Top 10 chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP) + β2 
(Exports as share of GDP) + β3 (Gross tertiary enrollment ratio) + β4 (Savings rate as 
share of GDP) + β5 (Population growth rate) + β6 (Regime type) + β7 (Contribution of 
natural resources to GDP) + ε 
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 The tables of regressions in the results section show that one “full” multivarirate 
regression—regression of GDP growth on chaebol dominance with all six control variables 
included—was run for each table. The model above describes the initial regression with no 
dummy variables. Subsequent regressions included year dummy variables to control for year-
specific idiosyncratic effects, country dummy variables to control for country-specific 
idiosyncratic effects, and both country and year dummy variables to control for both effects. 
 
 
D. Descriptive Statistics 
After their creation in the early 1960s, chaebols quickly became an important influence 
on the state of the Korean economy. Supported by the government’s trade policies and financial 
resources, such as subsidies and tax breaks, select chaebols grew especially rapidly and were 
essentially prevented from ever failing. Indeed, active government intervention can be found in 
every stage of the chaebol creation process. Entry barriers, erected by the government, allowed 
for only a handful of firms to dominate certain industries, and policies designed to support these 
firms allowed them to become chaebols. If these firms found themselves in trouble, government-
led industrial and corporate restructuring awaited. Thus, this cycle created the perfect 
environment for chaebol creation and retention.49 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Sung-Hee Jwa, The Evolution of Large Corporations in Korea: A New Institutional Economics Perspective of the 
Chaebol (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2002), 17. 
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Figure 1. Top 10 Chaebols’ Share of Korea’s GNP vs. Korea’s GDP Growth, 1973-1995 
 
Table 2. Top 10 Chaebols’ Share of Korean GNP and Korea’s GDP Growth  
Year Top 10 chaebols’ share (%) Korea’s GDP growth (%) 
1973 5.1 14.8 
1974 5.6 9.4 
1975 7.1 7.3 
1976 7.2 13.5 
1977 10.6 11.8 
1978 10.9 10.3 
1983 13 12.2 
1985 8.8 7.5 
1986 8.3 12.2 
1987 7.9 12.3 
1988 8.9 11.7 
1989 9.8 6.8 
1990 9.6 9.3 
1991 9.6 9.7 
1992 10.1 5.8 
1993 10.2 6.3 
1994 10.9 8.8 
1995 12.8 8.9 
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Source: Adapted from Lim (2003); Hattori (1997); Jwa (2002); World Bank World 
Development Indicators. 
  
Figure 1 and Table 2 capture the variation in top 10 chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP and 
in GDP growth over roughly two decades. Given such robust government support, one would 
expect chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP to increase steadily without much deviation. However, 
after reaching an astounding 13% in the early 1980s, the chaebols’ share plummeted down to 7% 
in the span of only about five years before starting to increase again. Several explanations can 
account for this sudden drop. First, because of its economic success in the two preceding decades, 
Korea became a target of U.S. trade wars in the early 1980s.50 Faced with great pressure from the 
United States, Korea had to open up its barriers to imports and foreign direct investment.51 With 
newly introduced foreign competition, chaebols’ export performance likely suffered, thus 
decreasing their relative share of Korea’s production. Second, the labor movement, which had 
been suppressed during the two decades before, became more militant in the 1980s. While it 
helped break the authoritarian state (a direct presidential election was held in 1987), the 
movement also “eroded the low-wage advantage of Korean products and forced Korea firms to 
introduce more innovative products to create another source of competitive advantage.”52 Thus, 
in 1980, the government came up with a new policy directive that emphasized liberalization and 
privatization. In the process, it drastically decreased direct financing to business, eliminated 
export subsidies, and shifted its attention to welfare issues.53 This marked the beginning of the 
souring of the once-prosperous government-chaebol relationship, and although chaebols 
                                                
50 Chang, 57. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 57-8. 
53 Ibid., 58. 
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continued to grow even without government support, the cessation of subsidies likely hurt some 
chaebol firms. 
 One additional inference can be drawn that have not been explicitly extrapolated. We can 
reasonably speculate that, as chaebols diversified into the information technology (IT) industry at 
the beginning of the 1980s,54 they could not initially operate economies of scale to achieve 
maximum profits, which explains the decline in their share of Korea’s GNP. However, as time 
went on, they were able to achieve scale economies and start to increase their share once again.  
 In order to make meaningful claims about the economic significance of regression results, 
I present below a table of descriptive statistics (see Table 3) that summarizes the mean and 
standard deviation of all variables included in the regressions, with the exception of the chaebol 
dominance variable, for which the change over time has already been noted through Figure 1. 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean SD 
GDP growth 3.76 5.00 
Exports as share of GDP 34.72 20.84 
Gross tertiary enrollment ratio 21.93 20.77 
Savings rate as share of GDP 20.93 10.49 
Population growth rate 1.61 1.33 
Regime type 0.57 0.49 
Contribution of natural resources to GDP 8.03 12.33 
N 2,999  
                                                
54 Lim, 80. 
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E. Results 
The t-test returned statistically significant results. The null hypothesis was that Korea’s 
average growth rate between 1961 and 2013 is equal to the average growth rate of the rest of the 
world during the same period. I can safely reject this null hypothesis because the difference 
between Korea’s average GDP growth and the average GDP growth of the rest of the world is 
statistically significantly larger than zero (p-value <0.0001). In other words, Korea had a 
statistically significantly higher mean growth rate than the mean growth rate of the rest of the 
world. 
 
Figure 2. Chaebols’ Share of GNP and GDP Growth (Entire Sample) 
 
 Figure 2 displays a scatter plot of the 2,999-observation sample with annual GDP growth 
on the y-axis and top 10 chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP on the x-axis, with a fitted line going 
through the data points. The vast majority of data points have a value of zero for the chaebol 
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share variable, because no other country in the dataset has the chaebol system. Scattered to the 
right are data points for Korea. The y-intercept is the mean of GDP growth rates for all countries 
except for Korea. The slope of the line indicates the change in growth rate of Korea, away from 
the mean growth rate for all countries except for Korea (y-intercept), per one percentage point 
change in chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP. This figure also shows that most of Korea’s data 
points for GDP growth are above the world average, which gives the line of best fit the observed 
upward slope. 
 
Figure 3. Chaebols’ Share of GNP and GDP Growth (Korea Only) 
 
 Because the mean growth rate of the rest of the world in in Figure 2 heavily influenced 
the slope of the line of best fit, it was necessary to try to determine the relationship between 
chaebols’ share of GNP and GDP growth only for Korea. Figure 3 isolates the data points for 
Korea. The slope of the fitted line becomes negative, possibly because of the outlier, the data 
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point that marks a negative growth rate for Korea in the late 1990s when the Asian financial 
crisis struck. Both Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide a helpful preview for the series of regression 
tables below; whereas chaebol dominance seems to increase Korea’s average growth rate from 
the world’s average, it seems to decrease Korea’s growth rate from its own average. 
 
Table 4. Multivariate Regression – No Dummy Variables 
VARIABLES GDP growth (annual %) 
  
Top 10 chaebols' share of Korea's GNP 0.434*** 
 (0.0728) 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.0117** 
 (0.00455) 
Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6) -0.000861 
 (0.00466) 
Gross savings (% of GDP) 0.0794*** 
 (0.0128) 
Population growth (annual %) 0.300*** 
 (0.108) 
Regime type -0.349 
 (0.238) 
Contribution of natural resources to GDP -0.0182 
 
 
(0.0132) 
Constant 1.547*** 
 (0.445) 
  
Observations 2,999 
R-squared 0.043 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The first regression was run without any control variables for year or country dummy 
variables in place (see Table 4). Not controlling for these dummy variables is problematic, since 
every observation for the growth variable is compared with every other observation in the 
sample regardless of the year or the country. Accordingly, the coefficient of 0.434 for the 
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chaebol dominance variable for the above regression can be interpreted as follows: holding 
constant the six aforementioned control variables, a one percentage point increase in top 10 
chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP increases Korea’s growth rate by 0.434 percentage points away 
from the mean of all other values for the GDP growth variable. Therefore, the resulting 
coefficient on the chaebol dominance variable, although statistically significant, does not hold 
any meaningful interpretation. 
 
Table 5. Multivariate Regression – Year Dummy Variables Only 
VARIABLES GDP growth (annual %) 
  
Top 10 chaebols' share of Korea's GNP 0.514*** 
 (0.0729) 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.00462 
 (0.00476) 
Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6) -0.0200*** 
 (0.00490) 
Gross savings (% of GDP) 0.0774*** 
 (0.0122) 
Population growth (annual %) 0.328*** 
 (0.104) 
Regime type -0.223 
 (0.233) 
Contribution of natural resources to GDP -0.0238* 
 
 
(0.0127) 
Constant 4.238*** 
 (0.698) 
  
Observations 2,999 
R-squared 0.120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The second regression included only the year dummy variables, the purpose of which was 
to isolate the comparison of the chaebol dominance variable’s effect on growth for specific years 
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(see Table 5). Instead of comparing an observation to all other observations in the sample 
regardless of what year the observations belong to, we can now compare the growth differentials 
resulting from increases in chaebols’ share of GNP for observations in the same year. Therefore, 
the coefficient for the chaebol dominance variable in this regression is interpreted as follows: 
holding constant the six control variables, each year, a one percentage point increase in top 10 
chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP increases Korea’s growth rate by 0.514 away from the mean 
growth rate of all other countries in the sample. The coefficient displays strong statistical 
significance, adding support for the first part of my hypothesis. 
 
Table 6. Multivariate Regression – Country Dummy Variables Only 
VARIABLES GDP growth (annual %) 
  
Top 10 chaebols' share of Korea's GNP -0.432 
 (0.523) 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.0111 
 (0.0176) 
Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6) 0.0273*** 
 (0.00923) 
Gross savings (% of GDP) 0.117*** 
 (0.0198) 
Population growth (annual %) 0.333** 
 (0.167) 
Regime type 0.859** 
 (0.407) 
Contribution of natural resources to GDP 0.0143 
 
 
(0.0310) 
Constant -0.483 
 (1.861) 
  
Observations 2,997 
R-squared 0.179 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The third regression included only the country dummy variables in order to control for 
within-country effects (see Table 6). I wanted to see whether higher chaebol share increases 
Korea’s growth rate away from its own average growth rate. In other words, does Korea grow 
faster than it usually does when chaebols’ share of GNP is higher? As can be seen from Table 6 
above, the coefficient for the chaebol dominance variable becomes negative after country 
dummy variables are added. The coefficient for chaebol dominance variable here can thus be 
interpreted this way: holding constant the six control variables, a one percentage point increase 
in top 10 chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP decreases Korea’s growth rate by 0.432 percentage 
points away from Korea’s mean growth rate. Essentially, this means that during the years when 
chaebols’ share of output was higher, Korea’s GDP growth rate was lower than its average 
growth rate by 0.432 percentage points. However, the chaebol dominance coefficient is not 
statistically significant, which implies that Korea’s deviation from its own mean growth rate 
could have well been due to natural fluctuations in growth rates that all countries experience. 
 
Table 7. Multivariate Regression – Year and Country Dummy Variables 
VARIABLES GDP growth (annual %) 
  
Top 10 chaebols' share of Korea's GNP -0.198 
 (0.466) 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.00559 
 (0.0172) 
Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6) 0.0182 
 (0.0116) 
Gross savings (% of GDP) 0.0957*** 
 (0.0193) 
Population growth (annual %) 0.401** 
 (0.177) 
Regime type 0.910** 
 (0.420) 
Contribution of natural resources to GDP 0.00941 
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(0.0309) 
Constant 3.646* 
 (1.927) 
  
Observations 2,997 
R-squared 0.231 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The final regression controlled for both country and year dummy variables (see Table 7). 
The coefficient for the chaebol dominance variable for this regression can be interpreted as 
follows: holding constant the six control variables, for every one percentage point increase in top 
10 chaebols’ share of Korea’s GNP, Korea’s deviation from its mean growth rate was about 0.2 
percentage points smaller than the average deviation of all other countries from their own mean 
growth rates. Again, however, the coefficient is not statistically significant, so this difference 
could have been due to chance. 
 Thus, the sole viable conclusion to be drawn here is with regard to the table with only the 
year dummy variables: when chaebols’ share of GNP is higher, Korea’s average growth rate is 
statistically significantly higher than the average growth rate of the rest of the world. 
 
 
F. Qualitative Discussion: Diversification and Vertical Integration  
Previous sections of this paper mentioned characteristics shared by chaebols, such as 
family ownership, diversification and vertical integration. This section analyzes how 
diversification and vertical integration helped chaebols achieve economies of scale and increased 
export performance, using both theoretical explanations and empirical data. In explaining the 
mechanism through which chaebols’ dominance in Korea’s economy affected the country’s 
 34 
 
growth, this paper discussed operation of economies of scale and export promotion. Why did 
chaebols decide to diversify and integrate vertically, and what have been the effects of this 
decision? 
Chaebols diversified into different, and sometimes unrelated, industries for two main 
reasons. The first reason had to do with risk aversion; chaebols diversified to reduce the risk of 
their founding families, which invested all their assets into affiliates.55 The second reason 
involves economies of scope, or efficiency derived from increased variety. A chaebol’s affiliates 
freely share technology with each other.56 This could help newly acquired or established 
subsidiaries by providing production and technology-related know-how, even to those that are 
involved in somewhat unrelated industries. To facilitate groupwide technical support for 
affiliates, chaebols established group-level R&D centers, organized “along broadly defined 
business lines such as automobiles and electronics to meet these affiliates’ common needs.”57 For 
instance, Samsung Group established the Samsung Advanced Technology Institute, which offers 
sophisticated technological information to all affiliates.58 Several of these affiliates finance their 
joint R&D ventures and share any technological innovations gained from this research.59 Data on 
composition of sales for Samsung indicates that the group “grew more by diversifying into new 
businesses than by expanding existing ones.”60 This pattern held true for other chaebols as well: 
groups like Hyundai, LG and SK diversified into the strategic industries chosen by the 
government by decade, first going into heavy (machinery and shipbuilding) and chemical 
                                                
55 Chang, 86. 
56 Ibid., 87. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 86. 
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industries, and later into IT. Table 8 below highlights the change in the average number of 
subsidiaries for top 30 chaebol firms. 
 
Table 8. Diversification Patterns of Top 30 Chaebols 
Year 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
Average 
number of 
businesses 
- - - - - 17.9 18.3 19.1 18.5 18.8 19.9 - - 
Average 
number of 
subsidiaries 
16.7 17.2 17.7 19.1 19.8 20.3 20.1 20.5 20.8 22.3 27.4 26.8 22.9 
 
Diversification can thus be viewed as the perfect method for chaebols for growth and 
profit. First, diversification reduced risk for founding family members by spreading it over a 
number of different industries. Second, chaebols were able to create synergies through active 
know-how, technology, and human resource management sharing among affiliates, making them 
more efficient and thus more competitive. Third, chaebols that diversified into new industries 
received economic support from the government in the form of subsidies, tax breaks and 
protection from foreign competition—at least initially. Thanks to both intragroup support and  
government help, chaebols that diversified into new industries prospered. And as their scale of 
production increased in these new industries, they were able to achieve economies of scale and 
bring down the average cost of production. 
Vertical integration, as mentioned briefly in an earlier part of this paper, refers to an 
indigenization of inputs for final products.61 There is thus a lot of “internal transfer of goods and 
                                                
61 Lim, 74. 
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services within a firm.”62 For chaebols, then, this means that affiliates supply other affiliates with 
parts, resulting in a high intragroup sales and purchase ratios. 
Unlike diversification, however, vertical integration does not appear to have clear reasons 
for chaebols to pursue. Yet the fact that essentially all chaebols did begs the question: why did 
chaebols integrate vertically? Chang (2003) explains that, during the era of Five-Year Economic 
Development Plans, the Korean government “forced chaebols into […] industries without 
building any infrastructure of parts suppliers or supporting services.”63 And since the chaebols 
found it difficult to secure necessary parts, but the government still pushed them to industrialize, 
vertical integration was a seemingly inevitable choice. 
 
Table 9. The Pattern of Chaebol Expansion 
Decade Related 
diversification 
Unrelated 
diversification 
Vertical 
integration 
Sub-total 
1940s     
n 1 2  3 
% 33.33 66.67   
     
1950s     
n 8 23 3 34 
% 23.53 67.65 8.82  
     
1960s     
n 21 44 24 89 
% 23.60 49.44 26.97  
     
1970s     
n 83 105 42 230 
% 36.09 45.65 18.26  
     
1980s     
n 106 100 35 241 
% 43.98 41.19 14.52  
     
                                                
62 Chang, 113. 
63 Ibid., 118. 
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1990s     
n 175 117 46 338 
% 51.78 34.62 13.61  
     
Total     
n 394 391 150 935 
% 42.14 41.82 16.04  
Source: Haggard, Lim and Kim (2003). 
Table 9 shows the pattern of business expansion for twenty-two chaebols since their 
founding years. As can be seen, there has been an upward trend in the extent of vertical 
integration by chaebols as a whole over time. Vertical integration remained a necessary part of 
diversification, since venturing into new industries required having some kind of input supplier, 
which the chaebols lacked. This was especially true for unrelated diversification (e.g. Hyundai, 
which started as a construction company, going into electronics), because inputs differed from 
industry to industry. 
Given that vertical integration follows diversification, many chaebol firms have 
established and maintained backward vertical integration with “very extensive and intricate 
networks of smaller affiliates that supply intermediary goods and parts to them.”64 For instance, 
Hyundai Pipe deliver construction pipes to Hyundai Construction, Hyundai Group’s construction 
company for overseas projects, and to Hyundai Industrial Development, Hyundai’s construction 
company focused on domestic needs. Hyundai Livart supplies furniture and interior decoration 
materials to Hyundai Construction and Hyundai Industrial Development. Hyundai Elevator 
distributes elevators to these core construction companies. Hyundai Group also engages in 
forward vertical integration. Hyundai Corporation, set up in the 1970s in accordance with the 
Korean government’s export drive, is a general trading company that serves as an intermediary 
of its affiliates’ exports and imports. Hyundai Corporation imports raw materials and equipment 
                                                
64 Ibid., 114. 
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and sells them to its affiliates on their behalf, which accounted for about 43% of its total revenue 
in 1997.65 It also purchases finished products from the affiliates and sells them in foreign markets, 
and this represents about 52% of the company’s total revenue.66 
 Vertical integration is also not specific to heavy machinery and construction industries, 
but instead can be seen in other types of industries as well. For example, Samsung Electronics is 
closely interlinked with Samsung SDI, a manufacturer of television tubes, which in turn relies on 
Samsung Corning, which produces glass bulbs for the tubes.67 Samsung Corning derives a 
whopping 61% of its total revenue from its sales to Samsung SDI, which in turns supplies 52% 
of its products to Samsung electronics.68 In fact, such vertical integration is not unique to 
Hyundai and Samsung; similar patterns are found in a lot of other chaebols, including SK and 
LG.69 Chang (2003) adds that this type of extensive vertical integration is “unique to chaebols 
with respect to business groups in other countries.”70 As can be seen, although the extent of 
vertical integration may vary from company to company and from industry to industry, it was a 
crucial part of chaebols’ growth. 
 Although vertical integration was somewhat forced on chaebols because of the 
government’s failure to provide parts supplier infrastructure, it brought chaebols some key 
benefits. First, a vertically integrated structure let chaebols’ core affiliates control the quality of 
important parts and delivery schedules, and allowed them to carry lower inventories.71 Second, 
similar to diversification, vertical integration had a positive spillover effect whereby the fruits of 
R&D were more likely to be shared with the other stages, increasing the overall competitiveness 
                                                
65 Ibid., 115. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 118-9. 
68 Ibid., 119. 
69 Ibid., 115. 
70 Ibid., 115-7. 
71 Ibid., 121. 
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of final products.72 Third, vertical integration reduces marketing and sales-related expenses.73 
The rationale for this is quite intuitive; sales often requires marketing of product lines, but 
because there is so much intragroup sales- and purchases-related activity for chaebol affiliates, 
the affiliate companies can spend less money on advertising their products to potential buyers.  
 To summarize, chaebols’ diversified business structure and high degree of vertical 
integration contributed significantly to their growth in size and increases in profit. Through 
intragroup resource sharing, chaebol affiliates were able to reap benefits of shared advances in 
technology and achieve economies of scope when affiliates entered new industries. Through 
government subsidies secured by entering into government-designated strategic industries, 
combined with an export-driven growth paradigm, chaebols were able to increase their scale of 
production and achieve economies of scale. Through vertical integration, chaebols were able to 
exercise control over the quality of important parts and delivery schedules, which in turn allowed 
them to bring products to the market much faster than comparable non-chaebol firms. Vertical 
integration also helped chaebols reduce marketing- and sales-related costs, because a large 
intragroup sales ratio allowed chaebol affiliates to spend less on using advertising to secure 
customers. Overall, diversification and vertical integration helped chaebols increase efficiency 
and cut costs, helping them rise to the forefront of the Korean economy. 
  
  
                                                
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 Korea’s economic growth between the early 1960s and mid-1990s was unprecedented. 
Achieving an average annual growth rate of 9%, Korea maintained the title of the fastest growing 
country in the world for those three and a half decades. Left in ruins in the aftermath of a 
devastating civil war, Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world at the beginning of the 
1960s, went on to establish itself as a so-called “Asian Tiger” for its robust growth and economic 
development. Scholars have identified a variety of factors in an attempt to explain this 
remarkable transformation. They pointed to such factors as export-oriented industrialization, 
emphasis on education, and high national savings rate, in an attempt to come up with a general 
explanation that could not only explain South Korea’s economic growth but also apply more 
broadly to other developing economies with a distinct lack of natural resources. Other scholars 
have examined a corporate structure unique to Korea—the chaebol system. 
 Although there is a consensus in the extant literature about the positive effect of chaebols 
on Korea’s growth, scholars have not isolated the effect of chaebols’ dominance in Korea on 
growth by holding other factors constant. The argument that I proposed in this paper—that an 
increase in chaebols’ dominance will increase Korea’s economic growth rate relative to the rest 
of the world’s average and relative to its own average—is based on the concept of economies of 
scale achieved by a combination of two most prominent features of chaebols: diversification and 
vertical integration. In order to support my hypothesis quantitatively, I have used regression 
analysis to show the isolated effect of chaebols’ share of Korea’s output on Korea’s growth. The 
results showed that, after controlling for exports, education, savings rate, population growth, 
regime type, and natural resources, chaebols’ dominance had a statistically significant effect on 
Korea’s GDP growth rate as compared with the growth rates of other countries. However, when 
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a series of regressions were run to test if Korea’s growth rate was higher than its own long-term 
average when chaebols’ share of output increased, the results came out statistically insignificant, 
meaning that chaebol dominance is not a statistically significant factor in explaining the within-
Korea variation in growth rate. 
 This paper examined the contribution of chaebols’ dominance in Korea on Korea’s 
growth rate, with a focus on the mechanism of economies of scale attained by diversification and 
vertical integration. This narrow focus suggests numerous avenues for future research. I highlight 
four. First, this paper asserted that chaebol dominance had an effect on growth through 
economies of scale, but other mechanisms, if any, through which chaebol dominance affected 
growth rate should be identified and explored. Chaebols are tightly integrated not only into 
Korea’s economy but also its society and culture. Thus, examining how chaebols affect such 
things as labor supply or labor demand, work hours, and productivity would be helpful in further 
understanding what kind of other effects chaebol dominance generates. Second, more attention 
should be paid to exactly how chaebols contributed to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. This 
discussion is especially interesting because the same system that so successfully led Korea to 
economic prosperity for three decades also became one of the major culprits for a major (albeit 
relatively short-term) financial crisis. Third, while this paper focuses on the years 1970-1995 for 
the purposes of regression analysis due to the lack of availability of data for chaebols’ share of 
GNP, subsequent research should attempt to procure data from the late 1990s onward and 
perform similar regression analysis. The purpose of this would be to see if chaebols still have an 
impact—whether positive or negative—on growth after chaebol-related reforms implemented at 
the end of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Fourth, while this paper examines the difference in 
growth rates between Korea and the rest of the world, future research could be more specific in 
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comparison. For instance, same multivariate regressions of growth on the dominance of a 
particular type of firm can be run for different countries. Specifically, Japan, the country from 
which chaebols are derived, and Taiwan, where small and mediums enterprises (SMEs) led 
economic growth, would be interesting cases for comparison to Korea.  
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Appendix 
 
A-1. Full List of Countries and Years in the Sample 
Country Frequency Year Frequency 
Albania 25 1970 3 
Algeria 7 1971 14 
Angola 12 1972 14 
Argentina 24 1973 14 
Armenia 16 1974 19 
Australia 39 1975 38 
Austria 38 1976 51 
Azerbaijan 6 1977 67 
Bahamas, The 12 1978 70 
Bahrain 17 1979 73 
Bangladesh 25 1980 74 
Barbados 17 1981 83 
Belarus 16 1982 84 
Belgium 7 1983 83 
Belize 8 1984 90 
Benin 32 1985 90 
Bhutan 3 1986 88 
Bolivia 10 1987 89 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9 1988 82 
Botswana 26 1989 86 
Brazil 19 1990 86 
Brunei Darussalam 8 1991 89 
Bulgaria 27 1992 83 
Burkina Faso 28 1993 84 
Burundi 20 1994 80 
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Cabo Verde 4 1995 92 
Cambodia 13 1996 90 
Cameroon 22 1997 72 
Canada 13 1998 73 
Central African Republic 16 1999 96 
Chad 3 2000 96 
Chile 30 2001 97 
China 25 2002 111 
Colombia 39 2003 117 
Comoros 3 2004 109 
Congo, Rep. 21 2005 110 
Costa Rica 17 2006 103 
Cote d'Ivoire 17 2007 98 
Croatia 12 2008 101 
Cyprus 30   
Czech Republic 16 Total 2,999 
Denmark 33   
Djibouti 12   
Dominica 7   
Dominican Republic 7   
Ecuador 15   
Egypt, Arab Rep. 24   
El Salvador 26   
Equatorial Guinea 1   
Eritrea 5   
Estonia 9   
Ethiopia 21   
Fiji 11   
Finland 34   
France 33   
Gabon 12   
Gambia, The 3   
Georgia 11   
Germany 7   
Ghana 11   
Greece 31   
Grenada 1   
Guatemala 12   
Guinea 18   
Guinea-Bissau 1   
Guyana 14   
Honduras 30   
Hungary 16   
 47 
 
Iceland 31   
India 28   
Indonesia 28   
Iran, Islamic Rep. 7   
Iraq 1   
Ireland 35   
Israel 32   
Italy 37   
Jamaica 7   
Japan 29   
Jordan 30   
Kazakhstan 12   
Kenya 16   
Korea, Rep. 20   
Kuwait 22   
Kyrgyz Republic 16   
Lao PDR 12   
Latvia 17   
Lebanon 7   
Lesotho 29   
Liberia 1   
Libya 2   
Lithuania 16   
Luxembourg 11   
Macedonia, FYR 13   
Madagascar 30   
Malawi 29   
Malaysia 27   
Maldives 1   
Mali 26   
Malta 37   
Mauritania 15   
Mauritius 30   
Mexico 28   
Moldova 13   
Mongolia 27   
Montenegro 2   
Morocco 31   
Mozambique 15   
Namibia 11   
Nepal 29   
Netherlands 36   
New Zealand 28   
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Nicaragua 16   
Niger 22   
Nigeria 12   
Norway 34   
Oman 28   
Pakistan 16   
Panama 28   
Papua New Guinea 9   
Paraguay 11   
Peru 27   
Philippines 27   
Poland 18   
Portugal 31   
Russian Federation 15   
Rwanda 23   
Saudi Arabia 37   
Senegal 17   
Serbia 2   
Sierra Leone 13   
Slovak Republic 13   
Slovenia 13   
Somalia 1   
South Africa 9   
Spain 34   
Sri Lanka 11   
St. Kitts and Nevis 8   
St. Lucia 14   
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 4   
Suriname 11   
Swaziland 14   
Sweden 38   
Switzerland 27   
Syrian Arab Republic 25   
Tajikistan 7   
Tanzania 15   
Thailand 29   
Togo 24   
Tonga 5   
Trinidad and Tobago 24   
Tunisia 33   
Turkey 33   
Uganda 20   
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Ukraine 14   
United Kingdom 38   
United States 37   
Uruguay 21   
Vanuatu 6   
Venezuela, RB 26   
Vietnam 12   
Yemen, Rep. 8   
Zambia 14   
Zimbabwe 14   
    
Total 2,999   
 
